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Abstract 
Market mediation literature has been taking primarily a triadic view in studying the 
role and impact of mediators, actors that occupy a middle position, on supply and 
demand conditions in markets. Mediating organizations facilitate exchange 
relationship on continuous basis between multiple networks of interdependent 
affiliated actors. An affiliation structure gives rise to the property of duality whereby 
the behavior and performance of the affiliates affect the behavior and performance of 
mediators and vice versa. In the context of the banking industry, this study examines 
how the structural properties of the underlying network of affiliated organizations 
affect the survival of affiliated organizations and the performance of mediating 
organizations. The results show that firms that are affiliated with mediating 
organizations having high customer-set connectedness or with those that are industry 
specialists increase their chances of survival. Furthermore, mediating organizations 
having high customer-set connectedness experience lower loan loss than peripheral 
ones. The study contributes to organizational studies by incorporating a network view 
to the predominately triadic market mediation literature, explicating the determinants 
of the effectiveness by which mediating services are rendered, and suggesting new 
sources of competitive advantage that advance as well as complement established 
explanations. Implications for the network perspective, organizational technology and 
the economic theory of the banking firm, as well as firm and mediator management 
are considered. 
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Market mediation literature is concerned with the role and impact of mediators, actors 
that occupy a middle position, on supply and demand conditions in markets. The role 
of mediators in markets has been explained in terms of efficiency enhancing, resulting 
from superior search processes, legitimacy enhancing in the presence of uncertainty 
and innovation enhancing (e.g. Hirsch 1972, Khurana 2002, Obstfeld 2005, 
Zuckerman 2000, Zuckerman and Kim 2003). Taking primarily a triadic approach, 
mediators were conceptualized as actors that amend (e.g. adjudication), substitute 
(e.g. Hirsch 1972) or establish (e.g. Obstfeld 2005) ties. The most extensive stream of 
literature on mediators is based on strategies for amending already existing but failing 
ties. Such is the work of marriage consultants or the legal adjudication system. A 
second stream of literature examines mediators that occupy the role of “surrogate 
consumers” that influence consumption through public recommendations and 
endorsements (Hirsch 1972, Zuckerman 2000, Zuckerman and Kim 2003). The third 
stream examines individual actors that establish relationships on ad hoc basis (Baker 
and Obstfeld 1999, Khurana 2002, Obstfeld 2005).  
This research extends the triadic market mediation literature by taking a 
network approach to mediation in studying mediating organizations. Mediating 
organizations make possible the physical, verbal, informational or financial 
interaction between actors. They occupy a middle position by virtue of their 
institutional role namely the facilitation of multiple exchange relations between 
actors. They primarily enable rather than conduct or initiate trade and exchange 
relations (e.g. North 1991). Their transactional, funding and risk services facilitate 
exchange ties on continuous as opposes to ad hoc basis between multiple actors. The 
paper advances our understanding of mediators by arguing that under conditions of 
uncertainty the structure of the network of affiliated actors, affiliated with a mediating 
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organization, impacts the return to the affiliated actors as well as the mediator by 
directly influencing the effectiveness of the mediating service. Mediating 
organizations influence members’ success and are simultaneously affected by their 
members.  
In the study of organizational failure, I develop and test a theory, which 
explicates the impact of the properties of the network of organizations affiliated with 
mediators on affiliated organizations survival and mediator performance. 
Organizational failure has been attracting academic attention for a considerably long 
period of time (e.g. Altman 1967, Baum and Mezias 1992, Stinchcombe 1965). 
Organizational failure provides an opportunity to learn and develop our analytical 
models of entrepreneurial value creation (McGrath 1999, Sitkin 1992). It is an ex-post 
measure, which constitutes the ultimate measure of performance. Its unique properties 
have given rise to various theoretical perspectives that attempt to explain 
organizational failure. The age dependence research in organization ecology examines 
the relationship between firm age, carrying capacity and failure rates (e.g. Brüdel and 
Schüssler 1990, Stinchcombe 1965). The resource-based view contends that failure of 
young firms is caused due to the lack of management competence and of older firms 
due to the lack of adjustments to changes in the competitive environment (Thornhill 
and Amit 2003). Economists have been focusing on failure predictions based upon 
financial ratios (Altman 1967) and sociological accounts break grounds with the focus 
on intra-firm explanations and investigate how the properties of supplier-customer 
networks impact firm failure (Uzzi 1996). 
Although organizational failure is commonly defined by the lack of capital to 
cover organizational financial obligations (Boardman et al. 1981) the role of financial 
intermediaries in affecting organizational failure is not clearly articulated. Financial 
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intermediaries are the largest external capital providers to small and medium size 
firms (Petersen and Rajan 1994). As the largest external capital providers they play a 
central role in influencing organization ability to meet financial obligations and hence 
also organizational survival (Bulow and Shoven 1978). 
Financial intermediaries are conceptualized as organizations that mediate 
merely between providers of capital and borrowers (e.g. Diamond, 1984). 
Accordingly, financial intermediaries provide services to an atomistic set of 
customers that are merely pool interdependent on one another. The atomistic 
conceptualization ignores the role that banks play in enabling trade (North, 1991). I 
relinquish the assumption of atomistic customers and examine the implications of 
borrowers’ interdependence on survival and performance.  
In particular I examine the relationship between the properties of 
organizational affiliation and organizational survival and financial intermediaries’ 
performance in the context of the Norwegian banking industry. I test hypotheses 
linking properties of the network of affiliated organizations with organizational 
survival probability and mediator performance by utilizing 462 randomly sampled 
firms drawn from a unique data set that contains the vast majority of firm-bank 
relationships in the Norwegian economy in the years 1999 to 2002. The uniquely rich 
data allow for the first time the testing of hypotheses linking the properties of the 
network of organizational affiliation and performance. I provide support for the 
important role of the network of organizational affiliation in influencing firm survival 
as well as mediating organization performance. 
The current research contributes not only to the market mediation literature 
but also to the fundamental search for the antecedents of competitive advantage. I 
argue that the underlying properties of mediator networks impact the performance of 
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both affiliated organizations and mediators. I provide support for the argument that 
the sources of competitive advantage or disadvantage do not necessarily reside in an 
attractive industry, (Porter 1980), intra-firm resources or capabilities (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993, Barney 1991) or inter-firm relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998) 
but in the composition of customer affiliation networks. 
Burt (2000: 411) argues that a task of future research is to separate 
performance effects of an individual’s first order network location from the second 
order network location of the organization to which he or she is affiliated. We have 
developed an impressive body of knowledge of how individual actor performance is 
influenced by an actor’s first order network, the network of the actor’s direct contracts 
(e.g. Burt 1992, Mizruchi and Stearns 2001). Much less is known on the impact of 
second order networks, the network that your direct contracts maintain with others, on 
actor as well as organization performance (Burt 2000). This article directly addresses 
Burt’s call by first specifying and analyzing multiple first order networks effects and 
then explicating and empirically examining how second order network effects, the 
effects originating from the properties of the organization with which firms are 
affiliated, impact performance. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Mediators affect supply and demand conditions in markets through their occupation 
of a middle position. Mediators are conceptualized as actors that amend (e.g. 
adjudication), substitute (e.g. Hirsch 1972) or establish (e.g. Obstfeld 2005) ties. 
Matchmakers, professional executive search firms, or security analysts create value by 
indirectly solving problems characterized by uncertainty to actors lacking relevant 
knowledge, competences or the legitimacy to take action. The mediating category of 
the triadic exchange typology (Simmel, 1950) has received minor academic attention, 
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(For exceptions see: Baker and Obstfeld 1999, Obstfeld 2005, Zuckerman 2000) 
rendering the mediator concept theoretically underdeveloped (Krackhardt 1999). 
Mediating organizations facilitate exchange relationships on continuous basis 
between numerous actors. They have as a primary function, the linking of clients or 
customers who are or wish to be interdependent (Thompson 1967). They have been 
found to occupy an important role in the economy as well as in social life (Davis and 
Mizruchi 1999, North 1991). Although practically all organizations are affiliated with 
mediating organizations, mediating organizations on their own rights are largely 
neglected objects of organizational theoretical and empirical inquiries (For exceptions 
see: Barnett and Carroll, 1987 and Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998).  
Mediating organizations such as telecommunication firms, airliners and 
financial intermediaries, are third party firms that create value by providing an 
amalgam of networking services to their respective customer sets. Value is a function 
of network size and composition (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). 
Mediator network is defined as all organizations, which are affiliated with a specific 
mediator at a specific point of time. Actor affiliation with mediators determines both 
network size and the network underlying properties.  
Affiliation network studies take as their starting point the central idea of foci 
(Feld 1981), a focus around which joint activities are organized (e.g., work places, 
families, etc.). Studies of affiliation networks, like interlocking directorship (Mintz 
and Schwartz 1981), and voluntary organizations (McPherson, and Smith-Lovin, 
1987), all conceptualize an affiliation network in terms of a set of actors and a set of 
social occasions or events (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Events or focuses are largely 
viewed as a method of classification and categorization rather than as actors which 
can be specifically analyzed and whose actions affect the value of affiliation. 
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Mediating organizations are conceptualized as the focuses or clubs, which 
provide networking services to facilitate exchange relations. Value created by 
mediating organizations is dependent not only on affiliation size but also on the 
properties of the affiliates and their interactions. The structural embeddedness of 
mediating organizations, i.e. the local structure of relations around them (Granovetter 
1985), impacts the value to affiliates as well as to mediators. 
The nested structure of affiliation gives rise to the network property of duality 
(Breiger 1974). Performance duality implies that the behavior and performance of 
affiliated organizations affect the behavior and performance of mediators and vice 
versa. Hence, misplacement of funds and wrongful project selection may have 
dramatic consequences for firm performance and ultimately for firm survival of both 
affiliated organizations and financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries are 
particularly vulnerable to bankruptcies. Customer bankruptcy rates threaten not only a 
financial intermediary short-term performance but also its viability and solvency. 
Financial intermediaries financing decisions in turn directly impact entrepreneurs’ 
activities and organizational success and failure.   
The institutional role of banks is to enable trade (North 1991). They enable 
inter-customer interaction on continuous basis by the provision of credit for 
investment, the funding of actual trade flows, the provision of payment service and 
the management of risk. From an institutional perspective, banks ameliorate 
information asymmetries. They operate in the presence of information asymmetry, 
which makes the provisioning of financial services to informationally opaque firms 
difficult (Berger et al. 2001). Uncertainty about the value of projects and the 
creditworthiness of borrowers can cause erroneous selections of new projects causing 
either the misplacement of funds or the failure to successfully select viable projects.  
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The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002) states that 
“[t]he heterogeneity of small firms has impeded the development of general standards 
for assessing applications for small business loans and has made evaluating such loans 
less straightforward and relatively expensive…Lender can use information gathered 
over time through long-term relationship with business owners and other members of 
the local community to monitor the health of the business and to build appropriate 
incentives into loan agreements” (Italic added). The above statement highlights both 
the relational and structural mechanisms that underlie bank funding of businesses. 
The relational mechanism stresses the role of direct cohesive ties as a 
mechanism for gaining fine-grained information (Uzzi, 1997). Recent contributions in 
organization theory and strategy show how the nature of the dyadic ties between 
banks and firms affect search costs and negotiations, alleviate risks of opportunism 
and enhance learning (Uzzi 1999, Uzzi and Lancaster 2003). Following this line of 
reasoning the nature of the dyadic relations between a firm and its banks affect the 
amount and quality of information that a bank is exposed to and hence the financial 
performance of firms. 
The structural mechanism stresses the role of indirect channels of information, 
reputation and referral (Baum et al. 2003). The GrameenBank, whose founder was 
recently awarded the Nobel Peace Price, taps into the knowledge of its customers who 
are friends and relatives of borrowers and rely on them for monitoring and 
sanctioning. By relating to the network of customers rather than to the atomistic 
individual customer (Boot 2000, Diamond 1984), the GrameenBank was able to 
overcome information hazards that impede the provision of credit and establish 
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms on behalf of the collective (Stiglitz 1990). 
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In an economy that increasingly relies on knowledge workers and intangible 
resources (Castells 1996), firms face similar challenges to the GrammenBank 
customers in transmitting their creditworthiness and the feasibility of their projects to 
banks. Hence, firms may share a property with the people at the bottom of the 
pyramid (London and Hart 2004) in the sense that they may have to rely on their bank 
being structurally embedded in the large network in which they themselves are 
embedded in order for the bank to obtain the information necessary to evaluate their 
projects. In this paper the sphere from which such information is gathered and 
learning occurs, is conceptualized in terms of a bank own network of business 
customers and the structure of the relationship between them. 
Figure 1a depicts the atomistic conceptualization (e.g. Diamond 1984) and 
Figure 1b depicts a simplified version of the connected, structurally embedded, 
conceptualization. In Figure 1a, banks mediate between providers of capital and 
borrowers. Banks provide services to an atomistic set of customers that are merely 
pool interdependent on one another (Thompson 1967). Resources are pooled and 
banks merely provide the delegated function of monitoring investments (Diamond 
1984). Bank learning is through dyadic exchange of information, which is subject to 
agency hazards. By assuming that customers are not structurally embedded, the 
atomistic conceptualization ignores the role that banks play in enabling trade (North, 
1991). 
Insert Figure 1 here 
In Figure 1b, the connected conceptualization, customers are embedded in 
inter-customer relations, which are represented by thick lines, in addition to customer-
bank relations. Customers are both pooled and directly interdependent on one another. 
Banks perform the joint roles of facilitating and enabling inter-customer exchange 
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(North 1991, Stiglitz 1990) and delegated monitoring on behalf of the collective. 
Bank learning and information availability is a function of a bank’s own network of 
business customers as well as the structure of the relationship between them. The 
paper relinquishes the assumption of the atomistic conceptualization and examines the 
implications of structural embeddedness on survival. 
Customer-set connectedness.1 Banks operate in the presence of inherent 
information asymmetry in their relationship to customers and must seek broadly on 
behalf of the collective of customers to overcome informational hazards that hinder 
exchange in the individual relationship. Banks process information pertinent to 
success or failure of customers embedded in a system of fragmented distributed 
knowledge (von Hayek 1945). Banks approach problematic loans by liquidating 
assets either pre-bankruptcy, severing customer relationships or re-negotiating loan 
contracts (Sinkey 1989). The ability of the bank to offer any of the above solutions is 
dependent on the early identification of problematic loans. The amount of information 
available to banks in relation to borrower’s business and industry in respect to 
finance, production, technology, marketing accounting, strategic and business 
planning, and competition (Sinkey, 1989) determines the timing of the identification 
of problematic loans. 
Bonacich (1987: 1171) argues that “the amount of information available to a 
unit in the network is positively related to the amount of information available to 
those with which it has contact”. Accordingly, mediator informational position is a 
function of the connectedness of its affiliated actors. Affiliated actors who are highly 
connected are sought after for their product and service qualities. They occupy a 
central position in the business network, which increases information availability 
                                                 
1 I employ the term customer-set connectedness to facilitate the understanding of the theory in the 
context of mediators. From both technical and social network theoretical perspectives, the appropriate 
concept is mediator centrality. 
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(Ingram et al. 2005, Powell et al. 1996). Ingram, Robinson and Busch, (2005) show 
that actor connectedness positively impacts the magnitude of trade flows due to the 
increase information availability. Information availability negatively affects 
uncertainty that surrounds exchange relationships by increasing opportunity 
recognition, facilitating quality evaluation, and reducing search costs.  
The aggregate degree of connectedness of individual affiliates determines 
customer set connectedness. A bank’s customer-set connectedness affects the timely 
access to, the quality and the breadth of information gained by indirect channels, 
referral, and reputation. The customer-set connectedness impacts the bank’s ability to 
evaluate bankruptcy risk by providing two substantive benefits: accurate assessment 
of risky loans and successful project selection before project initiation. Those 
activities are at the core of bank services and bank performance is highly dependent 
on the successful execution of those activities. Hence, a bank’s customer-set 
connectedness, conceptualized in terms of the attractiveness of affiliated organizations 
rather than of bank size, confers information benefits resulting in early identification 
of problematic investments or selection benefits of projects before initiation. All else 
equal, organizations affiliated with a bank that provide services to highly connected 
customer-set are expected to fail at lower rates than organizations that are affiliated 
with a bank that provide services to a sparsely connected customer-set. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. The greater the connectedness of a bank’s customer-set, the 
lower the likelihood of any particular customer bankruptcy. 
 
The moderating effect of age. While a bank’s customer-set connectedness may confer 
benefits to firms by improving information instrumental to project selection and the 
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termination or support decisions of existing projects, these benefits may not be 
equally distributed among firms. Young organizations are prone to higher failure rates 
due to the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965:148-9). They are particularly 
vulnerable due to their lack of experience and knowledge of the roles of the game 
(Baum 1996) or general industry knowledge of behavior and opportunities. Their lack 
of a formidable stock of experiences to draw upon is limiting. Competences and 
capabilities have not had the sufficient time to develop in order to provide competitive 
advantage. These include the lack of management competences (Thornhill and Amit 
2003). Young organizations are constrained due to their inability to influence the 
external environment and their lack of legitimacy. Firm resources may be stretched to 
the limit and credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) may hinder operations. 
Finally, young firms will not enjoy the stability of long-term customer-supplier 
relationships and will be exposed to frequent opportunistic behavior. Older 
organizations in contrast have had the opportunity to establish their reputation, 
credibility, reliability and accountability, but structural inertia may create an 
unreachable gap between the organization and its competitive environment leading to 
failure (Hannan and Freeman 1989, Thornhill and Amit 2003). 
The high risk associated with young firms increases the importance of a 
bank’s customer-set connectedness in the evaluation of firm bankruptcy probability. 
Under conditions of lack of relevant knowledge implied from firm age, connected 
mediators will be able to add more value to young firms than sparsely connected 
mediators because the informational advantages impacts the former mediator’s ability 
to select and evaluate projects as well apply the relevant management competences. 
This is similar to the advantages conferred to new firms from being affiliated with 
venture capitalists which provide management competences, industry specific 
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knowledge and information essential for the success of newly established firms. Older 
firms face lower levels of risks, have developed management competences and are 
knowledgeable of industry conditions. The impact of customer-set connectedness on 
the likelihood of survival diminishes as firms mature. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. The connectedness of a bank’s customers is more is more 
positively related to the likelihood of survival when the customer is young than 
when the customer is old.   
 
Mediator specialization. “There are many products for which the utility that a user 
derives from consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents 
consuming the good” (Katz and Shapiro 1985:424). Network economists argue that 
the value of participation for each actor in a network increases with network size 
(Economides 1996, Katz and Shapiro 1985). Such network externalities have been 
shown to affect technology adoption, pricing and network firm strategy (e.g. Katz and 
Shapiro 1985, Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998). If global network effects, or demand size 
economies of scale positively impact actor value from being affiliated with a specific 
mediator, one may expect that firms that are affiliated with larger mediators will be 
less likely to fail. While it is clear why the size of the network of users adopting DVD 
or having a cellular phone increases the value to each actor in the network, the 
mechanism by which network size can impact value creation in the presence of 
information asymmetry is not so straightforward. Information which flows in 
networks becomes more diffuse and difficult to manage as network size increases. 
Organizations learn in terms of encoding inferences from history into routines that 
guide behavior (Levitt and March 1988). For the understanding of learning and 
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routines attention should be given to the experience of individual organizations as 
well as to organizational networks (Håkansson 1987, Levitt and March 1988). I argue 
that mediators are presented with the opportunity to learn not only from specific firms 
but also from subgroups that are affiliated with them. 
Focusing on telecommunication services, Rholfs (1974) identifies identity-
based externalities whereby network externalities are generated by the identity of the 
other users connected. Rohlfs (1974) points out that network size may be 
conceptualized at a customer’s ego network level. The argument for identity-based 
externalities is that individuals tend to call their friends, families and colleagues, 
resulting in actors setting high value for identity-based ego network properties rather 
than for global ones.  
I advanced a different local mechanism namely information externalities. I 
argue that information externalities affect decision-making when the network of 
affiliated organizations provides access to relevant information about projects. The 
local network is conceptualized in accordance with the possession of pertinent 
information. Hence, it is the potential for reducing information asymmetry that 
defines sub-grouping and not necessarily the identity of the other members of the 
local network.  
One manner by which information externalities may come into play is in 
situations of mediator specialization. Mediator investment-based specialization is 
defined as the size of bank investments in each industry. Mediator specialization 
occurs due to mediators’ selection of specific firms, due to identity-network 
externalities whereby firms change affiliation when other organizations in their 
business network are already affiliated with a specific mediator or due to mediators 
creating reputation that specialized knowledge has been accumulated which attracts 
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previously non-affiliated firms. I argue that mediators that finance industry specific 
projects which amount to a large portion of their invested portfolio are motivated to 
learn from intra industry knowledge spillovers. Such knowledge including the 
demand for industry products or services, supply conditions, intra-industry rivalry, 
technological change and challenges facing the industry impacts mediators ability to 
evaluate specific firm’s bankruptcy risk. Such an exposure also motivates banks to 
pay attention to such industries and particular attention to specific industry actors that 
may be gravely affected by changing industry conditions. Hence, dependency 
enhances attention, which translates into learning. To the contrary, the servicing of a 
large number of actors from the specific industry without committing a large portion 
of resources to that industry diminishes the motivation to learn and explore intra-
industry knowledge. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The greater the bank’s specialization in a customer’s industry, 
the lower the likelihood of that customer’s bankruptcy. 
 
A relational mechanism, the investment by financial intermediaries in long-term 
credit relationships with their affiliated customers can mitigate problems of 
asymmetric information by producing information about firms and using it in their 
credit decisions (Boot 2000, Jensen and Meckling 1976) and increase customer power 
(Baker 1990, Uzzi 1999). The identification of possible bankruptcy requires a bank to 
have access to multiple reliable sources of information. Multiple banking 
relationships decrease bank power position and hence prices in markets (Uzzi, 1999), 
but power has less bearing in bankruptcy evaluation. Similarly, while exclusive 
relationships establish a channel for the transfer of fine-grained information, for 
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bankruptcy evaluation the value of this channel is inherently questionable (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). To merely ensure that the findings are not spurious due to the 
effects of the relational mechanism, namely the configuration of the firm-bank 
relationships, I directly control for this alternative explanation. 
Bank loss. What determines the performance of mediators? Previous research 
borrows the assumption from economics that if customer benefits are identified, 
mediators must have gained more benefits and shared them with their customers, 
(Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995, Uzzi 1999). To the extent that banks process 
information pertinent to the success or failure of customers embedded in a system of 
fragmented distributed knowledge, (von Hayek 1945) and in which information about 
vertically related activities is a source of uncertainty reduction, (Arrow 1975) 
customer-set connectedness is expected to impact the extent of bank loss. The 
performance duality (Breiger 1974) of affiliated organizations and mediators implies 
that properties of the affiliated network should impact bank performance as well as 
affiliated organization performance. 
It was argued that customer-set connectedness confers benefits in terms of 
early identification of questionable financial engagements. Accordingly, such 
engagements may be prematurely terminated and hence induce bankruptcy of projects 
with extremely low survival chances. The informed bank is presented with an 
opportunity to liquidate customer assets or withdraw its investments at an earlier stage 
than the non-informed bank resulting in lower loss per failed customer. Informed 
banks are also in a position to decrease the size of the investment loss. Whether by 
applying management competences suitable for firms experiencing financial crises or 
by superior knowledge regarding the opportunities to sell firm assets, the informed 
bank can reduce the total firm loss and hence bank loss. Hence when bankruptcy is 
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unavoidable the better-informed bank is in a position to a) withdraw financing early 
b) get a hold of assets before bankruptcy is declared c) refuse to grand more loans. 
Notwithstanding the specific bank choice, all three alternatives lead to a reduction in 
asset loss.  
It was also argued that customer-set connectedness confers benefits in terms of 
project selection. The selection advantage implies that when customer-set 
connectedness increases, its increased information enables it to select better projects 
and hence decrease the likelihood that any affiliated actor will fail. Superior selection 
capabilities impact the proportion of customer failures within any specific bank's 
portfolio of customers. All else being equal, the proportion of customer failures within 
a bank's portfolio of customers as well as bank loan loss originating from customers 
that actually fail will be negatively associated with the connectedness of a bank’s 
customer-set. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The greater the connectedness of a bank’s customer-set, the 
lower the bank’s loss per bankrupt customer. 
Hypothesis 3b: The greater the connectedness of a bank’s customer-set, the 
lower the proportion of customer failures within a bank's portfolio of 
customers. 
Methods 
Data Collection and measurement. 
I utilized multiple archival sources to construct a unique data set of Norwegian 
limited liability firms operating between 1999 and 2002 and their respective banking 
relationships. The Norwegian authorities provided me with tailor made data set 
containing all banking relationships of the vast majority of firms operating in Norway 
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in the years 1999 to 2002. The data contains bank-firm relationship based information 
for 98% of the Norwegian firms measured in terms of total sales. The information 
received was crosschecked with accounting entries for relative agreement on the 
aggregate with for example financial expenditure and revenue.  
Small and medium size firms (SME) with total sales between $1m to $50m 
per annum were chosen due to their heavy dependence on bank financing and the 
existence of meaningful information asymmetry between them and their mediators 
(Berger and Udell 1998). Large size firms have access to financial markets and 
personal sources may suffice micro size firms. From the SME population I selected 
firms, which had been providing reliable and continuous accounting and banking 
information for at least 4 consecutive years and the firms had reported bank loans in 
the last two years before bankruptcy. Hence, I excluded firms which failed to report to 
the Norwegian Company Register because such an omission is already a signal of low 
quality. Firms, which do not meet annual report submission deadlines lose their 
limited liability protection and are removed from the register of companies. The 
Norwegian Firm Register was utilized to construct the sample of the non-bankrupt 
firms and in order to gather accounting information for all sampled firms over a three-
year period. 
The Norwegian Firm Bankruptcy Register, updated weekly, contains detailed 
information including firm name, organization number, address, industry 
specialization and date of declared bankruptcy for all bankrupt firms. The information 
was crossed-referenced using the Norwegian Gazette, which publishes firm related 
registry changes in general, and bankruptcy announcements in particular. From the 
sampling frame of firms that comply with all the above restrictions I randomly 
selected two groups of 235 firms. The first group was randomly selected from the 
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target population of firms that did not go bankrupt. T-tests reveal no selection bias in 
terms of sales, assets, age and employees between the sample and the target 
population (p min = 0.330). The second group was randomly chosen from the target 
population of bankrupt firms. T-tests reveal no selection bias in terms of sales, assets, 
age and employees between the sample and the target population (p min = 0.256). 
Seven firms were excluded from the final analysis due to missing data.  
I argued that the configuration of the network of affiliated firms provides early 
signals to banks, which assist them in avoiding investment pitfalls. The reliability of 
different scoring techniques decreases as time horizon increases. The different Dun & 
Bradstreet scoring products for example can only predict bankruptcy with relative 
certainty a year before it occurs. In order to highlight the importance of the network of 
affiliated firms, I doubled the longest time interval provided by Dun & Bradstreet. 
Hence, the information regarding the evaluation of possible bankruptcy is lagged by 
two years. The dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of one if a firm 
was still operating two years after the date of data collection and zero if it failed. The 
dichotomous dependent variable and the relatively short time-span support the use of 
logistic regression. The regression parameters are expressed as log odds associated 
with unit increase in the predictors which are transformed into probabilities when 
necessary in this study (Cohen et al. 2003, Roncek 1991). 
Customer-set connectedness. I argued above that banks that provide services 
to connected customer-sets gain information benefits. In order to capture this unique 
property and measure customer-set connectedness I employed socio-metric techniques 
in the Survey of Norwegian Firm and Network Financing 2001. I collected affiliation 
data of focal firms and their main suppliers and customers. In total, 1498 inter-firm 
dyadic relations and all firm banking affiliations were identified. I counted the 
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number of relations that each bank received. Receipt of a relation is defined as the 
provision of financial services to the main supplier, or customer, of a focal firm. In 
line with Bonacich’s (1987) conceptualization of informational availability as a 
function of the information of those to whom an actor is connected, a bank, which 
provides services to a customer set that other organizations seek, is more informed 
than a bank that provides services to a customer set which is not particularly sought 
by other organizations. In controlling for the effects of ties that are channels for 
information and resource flow, Soda, Usai and Zaheer (2004) employed a very similar 
operationalization in measuring the connectedness of Italian TV production project 
teams. Hence, by adding the total number of those relations that each bank services I 
distinguish between banks in accordance with their overall customer-set 
connectedness. 
There are two qualifications for this measure. First, the count of relations per 
bank was divided by the total number of relations reported resulting in a percentage 
measure that could be compared across banks. Second, in order to control for the 
possibility that relations were recorded merely due to network size, I controlled for 
bank size by dividing the relation ratio mentioned above by bank size. Bank size was 
measured as its market share. Market share is the sum of the number of customer per 
bank divided by the total number of bank business customers. Market share was also 
calculated in terms of bank assets.   
Mediator investment-based specialization. Bank specialization evident from 
the distribution of affiliated organizations was measured in terms of bank 
concentration of activities in a specific industry. This measure is in line with previous 
research on knowledge spillover (Jaffe 1989, Jaffe et al. 1993). Using the Statistics 
Norway’s, the official Norwegian bureau of statistics, modification of the NACE 
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industry classification scheme (similar to the SIC), I divided the sample to 132 
different industries and constructed the measure by computing the ratio of the total 
loans of actors affiliated with bank j and operating in industry i divided by the total 
number of loans to all industries granted by bank j.  
In order to capture this specific effect of mediator investment-based industry 
specialization while excluding other explanations I included three more control 
variables. First, the bank regional investment was measured by the percentage of 
banks loans taken in the same region as the firm in question out of all banks loans. 
Second, the embeddedness of a bank in a region was measured by the bank’s regional 
market share.  The two measures assist in controlling for regional effects originating 
from banks that service high proportion of one industry because that industry is 
geographically concentrated or that the bank is regionally concentrated. Third, in 
order to isolate the effects of increased value merely from affiliation size as argued by 
network economists (e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985), I controlled for mediator customer 
size-based specialization, the number of firms from the same industry as the firm in 
question that are affiliated with the same bank. By combining the measure of mediator 
investment-based specialization and customer size-based specialization, I separate the 
effects of the number of affiliates and the effects of their respective importance. 
Firm-banks network concentration. The specific configuration of the firm-
banks relationship is measured by the Hirshman-Herfindahl index (e.g. Baker 1990, 
Uzzi 1999). The measure captures the different ties existing in a firm’s network. As 
the index approaches 1 a firm has an exclusive relationship to one bank. The firm 
consolidates its financial transactions with that bank using an exclusive tie and 
maintains relatively few arms’ length ties to other banks. As the index value 
decreases, a firm distributes its banking transactions among a larger number of banks 
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and it maintains a larger number of arm’s length relations. Due to the sensitivity of 
this measure to firm-banks network size, I controlled for network size operationalized 
as the number of banks that the firm in question maintains banking relationships with. 
Firm Status. Banks can be argued to decide to assist firms experiencing 
financial distress and hence prevent their bankruptcy due to the firm own status in the 
economy. This may be done regardless to information about or the economical 
evaluation of the firm. To control for this status-based argument I conducted a content 
analysis. I utilized a database, Atekst, which contains all the major Norwegian 
newspapers including those, which specifically specialize in business and economic 
issues. The number of times the name of each firm had been mentioned in the 5-year 
period prior to the date of data collection was weighted by the a) severity: the positive 
or negative nature of the statements about each firm and b) focus: the extent to which 
the article was focusing on the firm mentioned. 
CEO and ownership networks. Firm survival can be argued to be dependent on 
the nature of the social networks that its managers and owners are involved with (e.g. 
Davis and Mizruchi 1999). In order to control for this line of reasoning, in computing 
CEO network size I not only examined the number of ownership positions that CEOs 
maintained in other firms but also the number of other CEO positions that those CEOs 
held. In order to control for the CEOs access to resources, I computed CEO network 
value, the average size of those firms (either partially owned by the CEO or where the 
CEO of a firm in my sample is also a CEO of another firm). I also controlled for 
ownership network size and ownership network value by measuring both the number 
of outside ownerships that the firm owners maintained and the relative size of those 
investments. 
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A note on second order network effects. An impressive body of work has 
established theoretical and empirical links between first order networks and actor 
performance (For a review see: Burt, 2000). In order to ensure that second order 
network effects hypothesized in this research are not spurious, this research controls 
for four different first order networks effects. While the vast majority of network 
research examines merely one type of network (e.g. Uzzi 1997), by examining firm-
banks networks, intra-bank networks, CEO network and ownership network, this 
research is one of the growing number of network based research that focuses on two 
or more networks simultaneously (e.g. Hedström et al. 2000). 
Organization size. Previous research has provided support for the assertion 
that firm size has a significant negative impact on organization failure rates (e.g. 
Baum and Mezias 1992). Small organizations may need to stretch their resources to 
their limits and may be prone to failure due to relative minor changes in, for example, 
interest rates or short-term capital availability. Larger organizations are less likely to 
fail due to the higher likelihood of assets accumulation, the option of down scaling 
operations as well as their established reliability and accountability (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989). Organization size is measured in terms of the average income over 
two years.  
Organization age. Young organizations are prone to higher failure rates due to 
the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965) which implies the lack of experience and 
knowledge of the rules of the game (Baum 1996), the inability to maneuver in the 
external environment and the lack of legitimacy. Taking an information gathering 
perspective, the uncertainty surrounding a firm decreases in a non-linear manner with 
time, as third parties are able to gather reliable information about the firm by 
comparing and contrasting for example previous annual reports. Consistent with 
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financial economic literature (Petersen and Rajan 1994) and organization ecology 
literature (Baum and Mezias 1992) organization age is measured by the natural log of 
the number of years since founding date minus two. 
Environmental uncertainty. I controlled for industry level environmental 
uncertainty by computing the coefficient of variation (Tosi et al. 1973). The 
coefficient of variation was measured by calculating the volatility of sales over 5 
years for each of the 132 industries utilized in this study. I first computed industry 
average sales per year. Thereafter I summed the one fifth of the squared term of an 
industry average sale for each year minus the average sales of each industry over the 
five-year period. I divided the square root of the sum by the average sales of each 
industry over the five-year period. All else equal firms operating in volatile industries 
are expected to fail at higher rate than firms operating in relatively stable industries. 
Metropolitan area. In order to control for potentially differing failure propensities for 
firms located in urban areas and those located in rural areas, I included a dummy 
variable, which takes 1 when a firm is located in or in the vicinity of a metropolitan 
area. Industry control. I included seven industry specific dummy variables to control 
for industry specific effects that could have affected firm survival chances.  
Indicators of financial distress. Financial ratios were utilized to account for 
the effects of current financial situation on the likelihood of bankruptcy. I control for 
the financial indicators proposed by Altman (1983) who tailor-made previous models 
to fit to non-public incorporated firms. I include the following ratios; (1) current 
ratio: current assets minus current liabilities divided by total assets, (2) earning ratio: 
earnings before interest rate expenditure and tax divided by total assets, (3) equity 
ratio: book value of equity divided by the book value of total liabilities. 
Organizational studies usually assume that financial indicators are simply mediators 
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of the competitive situations affecting organizations. In order to ensure that I study 
firms with a comparable risk of failure I include the above-mentioned financial 
indicators. By including those indicators I reduce the likelihood of finding significant 
relations however I also considerably reduce the likelihood of finding spurious 
relations. Organization growth. Firms experiencing different growth rates are also 
likely to differ in terms of their likelihood of failure. Building upon Weinzimmer, 
Nystrom and Freman’s (1988) suggestion for the measurement of organization 
growth, I included firm growth of assets to supplement the three financial ratios 
already used. 
The performance duality between affiliated organizations and mediators 
implies that it is necessary to examine the impact of properties of the network of 
affiliated organizations on bank performance. It should be noted that the sample size 
here is merely of 30 banks. However, no previous research in financial economics, 
organization theory or strategy had access to such detailed data to be able to measure 
customer-set connectedness rather than bank size. In studying loss incurred by banks 
and the proportion of customer failures within a bank's portfolio of customers, I 
utilized information from the Firm Bankruptcy Register. The banking relationships of 
all firms with assets below $50m failing between 1999 and 2001 and reported by the 
Firm Bankruptcy Register were identified.  
Bank loss, the first dependent variable was measured as the standardized 
average bank loss per failed customer over the three-year period. I summed all bank 
assets invested in firms that failed a year before the declared bankruptcy and divided 
by the number of failed customers. The second dependent variable the proportion of 
customer failures within a bank's portfolio of customers was calculated as the 
percentage of firms that actually failed out of the total number of firms affiliated with 
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each bank. Unlike the restricted population frame from which firms were sampled for 
the testing of hypotheses 1 and 2, no limitations, but for maximum firm size were 
applied on the nature of firms chosen for testing of hypotheses 3a and 3b. Bank size. 
Bank size was measured by the sum of the number of customer per bank. Bank 
growth. I used bank growth to control for bank strategy that may affect bank loss. In 
banking, growth strategies can be associated with mismanagement and the arbitrary 
selection of new projects leading to high future losses and eventually to bankruptcy. 
Bank growth was measured in terms of growth of bank assets invested in 
organizations over a three-year period. 
Results. 
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations and correlations for the measured 
variables. Table 2 shows the results of hierarchical logistic regression analyses 
estimating the effects of customer-set connectedness, mediator specialization and firm 
age on the likelihood of survival. Stepwise addition is utilized to show how the model 
behaves when new sources of heterogeneity are introduced.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here 
Model 1 in Table 2 estimates the effects of economic and ecological variables 
on the likelihood that a firm is still in business two years later. Both firm age and firm 
growth marginally impact the likelihood of survival. The economic indicators of 
distress suggested by Altman (1983) are significant. Geographical location in terms of 
urban and rural areas and industry controls and industry specific environmental 
uncertainty do not significantly impact the likelihood of survival. 
Customer-set connectedness is theorized to lower the likelihood of customer 
bankruptcy. Model 4 in Table 2 provides support for hypothesis 1a. The coefficient 
for customer-set connectedness is positive and significant. This indicates that a 
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customer-firm affiliated with a bank that is central in business networks above and 
beyond the expected bank size based connectedness level, increases its likelihood of 
survival. Employing the technique proposed by Roneck (1991) to evaluate logistic 
regression coefficients in terms of probabilities, a one-unit increase in customer-set 
connectedness, holding all other variables at their means, increases the probability of 
survival by 0.15. To further examine the impact of customer-set connectedness on the 
likelihood of survival, I examine the independent effect of bank size on the likelihood 
of firm going bankrupt. Bank size, measured in terms of bank market share of assets, 
was found to insignificantly impact firm survival (β = 1.43, s. e. = 1.26, p = 0.21). 
Hence, an independent effect of bank size as a source of influence on the probability 
of firm bankruptcy suggested by network economists, (Katz and Shapiro 1985) was 
not supported. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes that the greater mediator investment-based 
specialization, the lower the likelihood of customer bankruptcy. The results presented 
in Model 5 in Table 2 provide support for hypothesis 2. Mediator customer-size based 
specialization and regional specialization do not significantly impact the probability 
of firm survival. However, the coefficient for mediator investment-based 
specialization is positive and significant.  
Hypothesis 1b states that customer-set connectedness is more positively related 
to the likelihood of survival when a customer-firm is young than when a customer-
firm is old. Following Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken (2003) I mean-centered the age 
and customer-set connectedness variables and entered the multiplicative interaction 
term into the logistic regression model. The coefficient for the interaction effect 
(Model 6 in Table 2) is negative and significant and the model improves the previous 
model providing support for hypothesis 1b.  
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Insert Figure 2 here 
I plotted the interaction effect between firm age and customer-set 
connectedness by using the predicted probability of survival (Roncek, 1991). As 
depicted in Figure 2, the slope for the likelihood of young customer-firm survival is 
increasing almost exponentially when customer-set connectedness increases. Young 
firms increase considerably their likelihood of survival when affiliated with banks 
having high customer-set connectedness. Firm success is not sensitive to customer-set 
connectedness when firms are older. Finally, Model 6 also indicates that for fast 
growing firms, bank specialization in their respective industries significantly impacts 
their chances of survival.   
An alternative argument to the theory advanced here which is based upon the 
relational mechanism, is that the greater the firm-banks network concentration, the 
lower the likelihood of firm bankruptcy. As shown in Model 2 in Table 2, the 
coefficient for firm-banks network concentration is positive but insignificant. As 
expected firm-banks network size is negative but it is insignificantly associated with 
firm survival. The above suggests that information flowing between bank managers 
and entrepreneurs does not assist the former in detecting early signs of firm failure. 
Model 3 in Table 2 examines another alternative argument, which implies that 
banks support firm of high status. The findings indicate that bank-managers decision 
whether or not to assist firms in financial distress is negatively affected by firm status. 
A firm’s celebrity status can indicate the firm’s engagement in nonconforming 
behavior rather than success (Rindova et al. 2006). Finally, the interlocking 
directorate literature (e.g. Davis and Mizruchi 1999) has established that the networks 
in which managers and board members of large listed firms are embedded affect 
access to information and resources to firms. I tested the impact of CEO and 
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ownership networks on small and medium size firms’ survival on a smaller sample of 
firms for which such governance data are available. CEO network size and CEO 
network value had no impact on survival probabilities (β = .579, s. d. = .446, p = .195 
and β = -.038, s. d. = .136, p = .780 respectively). Ownership network size and 
ownership network value did not impact survival probabilities (β = -.097, s. d. = .395, 
p = .801 and β = -.023, s. d. = .230, p = .922 respectively). 
The performance duality between affiliated organizations and mediators 
implies that it is necessary to examine the impact of properties of the network of 
affiliated organizations on bank performance. Table 3 presents means, standard 
deviations and correlations for all measured variables. Tables 4 and 5 present the 
estimators for OLS regression. 
Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 here 
Model 1 in Table 4 contains the control model and model 2 the full regression 
model. Hypothesis 3a states that the greater customer-set connectedness, the lower the 
bank loss. Customer-set connectedness is significantly and negatively associated with 
bank loss per failed customer. Bank growth and bank size do not significantly impact 
bank loss. Similar results were obtained when variables were measured using a two-
year window. To supplement this analysis I also examined to what extent customer-
set connectedness affects the proportion of customer failures within a bank's portfolio 
of customers. The positive and significant findings reported in Model 2 in Table 5 
support hypothesis 3b. Hence, not only banks having connected customer-sets enjoy 
benefits in terms of lower loss per failed customer mainly due to the receipt of early 
distress signals, but also their affiliated customers are less likely to fail due to better 
selection processes. 
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Discussion 
The objective of the paper was to enhance our knowledge of organizational failure 
and mediators. I examined the impact of the structure of organizational affiliation on 
affiliated organizations and mediators performance in the context of organizations that 
create value by facilitating exchange relations. I found support for the argument that 
organizational affiliation with mediators impact small and medium size firm survival 
as well as bank performance. Customer-set connectedness and investment-based 
industry specialization were found to increase the likelihood of small and medium 
firm survival. The central ecological variable age moderates the relation between 
customer-set connectedness and firm survival. Young firms have yet to develop 
appropriate resources, relations, capabilities and knowledge and thus benefit the most 
from being affiliated with knowledgeable and well-informed mediators. Old firms do 
not gain survival benefits from being affiliated with those mediators. Growing firms 
were shown to get the full benefit of mediator specialization. Their likelihood of 
survival is increasing rapidly when they growth fast and their mediator specializes in 
their respective industries.  
I additionally found support for the argument that mediators, which affect the 
network of affiliated organizations, are affected by the properties of the networks that 
they serve. Network composition was found to matter. Bank loss per failed customer 
and the proportion of customer failures within a bank's portfolio of customers, 
decrease as customer-set connectedness increases. 
The findings are constrained by the limited number of network properties 
studied and the scope of my data. I focused on the impact of customer-set 
connectedness and subgroup specialization on firm survival. Future studies should 
develop upon this initial empirical attempt to carefully investigate the relationship 
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between different affiliated network properties and the return to affiliated firms and 
mediators. Network conceptualization, originating from a long tradition in sociology 
of studying networks might be employed in conjunction with the relatively new 
economic explorations of networks (Economides 1996, Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
The current study highlights the benefits the flow from being affiliated with a 
mediator whose composition affects its effectiveness in executing mediating services. 
Future research should augment the bank-focused perspective presented with 
customer ego-centered network perspective. A within-bank analysis can substantially 
enrich the current research by specifying the relations between bank network 
properties, individual firm ego-centered network properties and firm and mediator 
performance. Future work should further theorize and test the impact of different 
network properties of individual firms, like structural holes, on firm survival as well 
as other crucial performance parameters. In the context of banking, parameters such 
as the cost of capital and availability of capital to small and medium size enterprises 
are obvious candidates.  
The geographical specificity and the cross-sectional nature of the data 
constitute further limitations of this study. Although the Norwegian banking system 
shares a variety of characteristics with other banking systems, like having similar 
number of banking relationships to those maintained by U.S business customers, 
future research should explore the applicability of the theory presented in both 
relationship and market based banking systems. Longitudinal studies are further 
necessary to establish the link between the underlying network of affiliated 
organizations and the performance of affiliated organizations and mediators. 
The paper advances organization theory and strategic management in various 
ways. First, the paper extends the growing literature on market mediation (Khurana 
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2002, Obstfeld 2005, Zuckerman and Kim 2003). I examined how the network of 
affiliated actors affects the effectiveness of mediating services and the performance 
duality. Value is derived not only through superior search and legitimacy as argued by 
the triadic-based market mediation research (Baker and Obstfeld 1999, Khurana 
2002) but also from membership in a collective and from the properties of the 
collective. Previous research examined actors that occupy a middle position and 
amend, substitute or establish ties. The current study extends this by examining a 
class of mediators that occupies a central structural position and facilitates exchange 
ties. Mediating organizations facilitate ties between affiliated network members. They 
influence members’ success and are simultaneously affected by their members. 
The lack of research into the operation of the mediating organizations is 
startling considering the central role of mediating organizations in economic life 
(North 1991). There is a large vacuum in organizational studies of mediating 
organizations and the mechanisms by which value is created in the context of such 
organizations. The paper provides some evidence concerning the impact of mediating 
firms and their networks on the ultimate performance measure namely firm survival 
and invites scholars to fill in the theoretical and empirical voids. Future studies should 
extend this research to examine the membership properties of related mediating 
organizations such as insurance companies, investment banks and security brokers 
and their impact on competitive advantage of such firms. 
Second, I contribute for the fundamental search for the sources of competitive 
advantage. The empirical evidence suggests that, at least in mediation, the network of 
affiliated organizations is a source of competitive advantage to both affiliated 
organizations and mediators. Taking the industry structure view (Porter 1980), it is 
challenging to include the network of affiliated organizations in Porter’s five forces. 
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Are mediators’ affiliated organizations suppliers, customers, or both? (Stabell and 
Fjeldstad 1998). Taking the resource based view (Barney 1991) it is challenging to 
explain the distribution of organizations across mediators and their impact on 
performance purely in terms of intra-mediator specific resources or capabilities, or its 
inter-organizational relations (Dyer and Singh 1998). Future research should evaluate 
how well established strategic models, like Porter’s five-forces, can be amended to 
take in account mediating organizations. Research has already advanced the value 
network and shop models to supplement the value chain (Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998).  
The study provides a new avenue for network research. Network studies have 
been paying much attention to intra-organizational and inter-organizational networks 
conferring benefits and creating obstacles to economic actors (e.g. Granovetter 1985, 
Powell et al. 1996). The studies focus on network, which are sparsely connected, 
decentralized, and cliquey with “shortcuts” (Baum et al. 2003). Network studies that 
explicitly address the role of mediators are generally lacking from the broad scope of 
network studies (Krackhardt 1999). This research calls for further network inspired 
research into conditions under which the set of affiliated actors impacts traditional 
network affected phenomena such as innovation and change. Future research should 
further explore how networks that contain actors that create value by facilitating 
exchanges and work on improving their networks differ from those that do not contain 
such actors. 
The study also contains implications for contemporary banking theory. The 
isolated impact of concepts such as transaction costs and information asymmetry 
explaining bank existence are being called into question (Allen and Santomero 1998, 
Thakor 2000). Financial intermediation theory is in a great need for theoretical 
renaissance to be achieved by challenging the assumptions of the current paradigm 
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(Thakor 2000). Rather than continuing conceptualizing banks as mediating only 
between depositors and borrowers, by relinquishing the assumption of actor 
independence in the economics of banking, new insights about banks emerge. I 
suggest that banks can also be conceptualized as facilitating real-life direct exchange 
relationships and the exchanges facilitated, and those not facilitated, determine banks’ 
as well as affiliated customers’ performance. Thus, the paper provides new 
possibilities for further development of contemporary banking theory. 
The findings suggest important managerial implications. From the affiliated 
organizations perspective, it suggests that the choice of a financial institution is not 
trivial but of vital importance to organizations. Banks that service related industry 
customers and which are embedded in connected customer-sets are more attractive to 
firms than non-specialized and sparsely connected banks. Taking a bank perspective, 
a specialized and connected bank is more likely to attract good projects or 
alternatively select such projects successfully. Banks face the strategic challenge of 
organizing activities and structures in order to foster the development and utilization 
of internal information markets, which decrease their losses. 
In conclusion, this study establishes that the properties of the underlying 
network of affiliated organizations affect the effectiveness of the service rendered by 
mediating organizations. The network of affiliated actors impacts the survival of 
affiliated organizations as well as the performance of mediating organizations. The 
research further articulates the mediating concept by extending its scope and by 
introducing both a network perspective and the property of duality. The study also 
provides evidence that the sources of performance differentials between organizations 
do not necessarily reside within an industry or within firm boundaries but in the 
composition of customer affiliation networks. 
 34
References 
Allen, F., A. M. Santomero. 1998. A theory of financial intermediation. J. Banking 
Finance 21(11-12) 1461-1385. 
Altman, E. I. 1967. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy. J. Finance 23 589-609. 
Altman, E. I. 1983. Corporate financial distress. John Wiley, New York. 
Amit, R., P. J. H. Schoemaker. 1993. Strategic assets and organizational rent. 
Strategic Management J.  14(1) 33-46. 
Arrow, K. J. 1975. Vertical Integration and Communication. Bell J. Econom.  6(1) 
173-183. 
Baker, W., E., D. Obstfeld. 1999. Social capital by design: Structures, strategies, and 
institutional context. R. T. Leenders, S. M. Gabbay, Corporate social capital 
and liability. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 89-105. 
Baker, W. E. 1990. Market networks and corporate behavior. Amer. J.  Sociology 
96(3) 589-625. 
Barnett, W. P., G. R. Carroll. 1987. Competition and mutualism among early 
telephone companies. Admin. Sci. Quart. 32(3) 400-421. 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. J. Management 
17(1) 99-120. 
Baum, J. A. C. 1996. Organizational Ecology. S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy,W. R. Nord,. 
Handbook of Organizations Studies. Sage Publications, London, 77-114. 
Baum, J. A. C., S. J. Mezias. 1992. Localized competition and organizational failure 
in the Manhattan hotel industry, 1898-1990. Admin. Sci.  Quart.  37(4) 580-
604. 
Baum, J. A. C., A. V. Shipilov, T. J. Rowley. 2003. Where do small worlds come 
from? Indust. Corp. Change 12(4) 697-725. 
Berger, A. N., L. F. Klapper, G. F. Udell. 2001. The ability of banks to lend to 
informationally opaque small businesses. J. Banking Finance 25(12) 2127-
2167. 
Berger, A. N., G. F. Udell. 1998. The economics of small business finance: The roles 
of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. J. Banking 
Finance 22(6-8) 613-673. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2002. Report to the Congress on 
the Availability of Credit to Small Businesses. Washington, DC. 
 35
Boardman, C. M., J. W. Bartley, R. B. Ratliff. 1981. Small business growth 
characteristics. Amer. J.  Small Bus. 5(Winter) 33-42. 
Bonacich, P. 1987. Power and centrality: A family of measures. Amer.  J. Sociology 
92(5) 1170-1182. 
Boot, A. W. A. 2000. Relationship banking: What do we know? J. Financial 
Intermediation 9(1) 3-25. 
Breiger, R. L. 1974. The duality of persons and groups. Social Forces 53(2) 181-190. 
Brüdel, J., R. Schüssler. 1990. Organizational mortality: The liabilities of newness 
and adolescence. Admin. Sci. Quart. 35(3) 530-547. 
Bulow, J., I., J. B. Shoven. 1978. The bankruptcy decision. Bell J. Econom.  9(2) 437-
456. 
Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural holes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: MA. 
Burt, R. S. 2000. The network structure of social capital. B. M. Staw, R. I. Sutton, 
Research in organizational behavior. JAI Press, Greenwich, CT 345-423. 
Castells, M. 1996. The rise of the network society. Blackwell, Oxford. 
Cohen, J., P. Cohen, S. G. West, L. Aiken, S. 2003. Applied Multiple 
Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 3rd ed. Lawrence 
Erlbaum, New Jersey. 
Davis, G. F., M. S. Mizruchi. 1999. The money center cannot hold: commercial banks 
in the U.S. system of corporate governance. Admin. Sci. Quart.  44(2) 215-
239. 
Diamond, D. W. 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Rev. 
Econom. Stud.  51(3) 93-414. 
Dyer, J. H., H. Singh. 1998. The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Acad. Management Rev.  23(4) 
660-680. 
Economides, N. 1996. The economics of networks. Inter. J. Industrial Org.  14(6) 
673-699. 
Feld, S. L. 1981. The focused organization of social ties. Amer. J. Sociology 86(5) 
1015-1035. 
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of 
embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociology  91(3) 481-510. 
Hannan, M. T., J. H. Freeman. 1989. Organizational Ecology. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 36
Hedström, P., R. Sandell, C. Stern. 2000. Mesolevel networks and the diffusion of 
social movements: The case of the Swedish social democratic party. Amer. J. 
Sociology 196(1) 145-172. 
Hirsch, P. M. 1972. Processing fads and fashions: An organization-set analysis of 
cultural industry systems. Amer. J. Sociology 77(4) 639-659. 
Håkansson, H. 1987. Industrial technological development: A network approach. 
Croom Helm, London. 
Ingram, P., J. Robinson, M. L. Busch. 2005. The intergovernmental network of world 
trade: IGO connectedness, governance and embeddedness. Amer. J.  Sociology 
111(3) 824-858. 
Jaffe, A. B. 1989. Real effects of academic research.  Amer. Econom. Rev. 79(5) 957-
970. 
Jaffe, A. B., M. Trajtenberg, R. Henderson. 1993. Geographic localization of 
knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. Quart. J. Econom.  
63(3) 577-598. 
Jensen, M. C., W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, 
agency costs, and ownerships structure. J. Financial Econom. 3(4) 305-360. 
Katz, M. L., C. Shapiro. 1985. Network externalities, competition and compatibility. 
Amer. Econom. Rev. 75(3) 424-440. 
Khurana, R. 2002. Market triads. A theoretical and empirical analysis of market 
intermediation. J. Theory Social Behaviour 32(2) 239-262. 
Krackhardt, D. 1999. The ties that torture: Simmelian tie analysis in organizations. 
Res. Sociology Org. 16 183-210. 
Levitt, B., J. March, G. 1988. Organizational learning. R. W. Scott, J. Blake. Annual 
Rev. Sociology. Annual Reviews, Palo Alto, CA, 319-340. 
London, T., S. L. Hart. 2004. Reinventing strategies for emerging markets: Beyond 
the transactional model. J. Intern. Bus. Stud.  35(5) 350-370. 
McGrath, R. G. 1999. Failing forward: Real options reasoning and entrepreneurial 
failure. Acad. Management Rev. 24(1) 13-30. 
McPherson, M. J., L. Smith-Lovin. 1987. Homophily in voluntary organizations: 
Status distance and the composition of face-to-face groups. Amer. Sociological 
Rev. 52(3) 370-379. 
Mintz, B., M. Schwartz. 1981. Interlocking directorates and interest group formation. 
Amer. Sociological Rev. 46(6) 851-868. 
 37
Mizruchi, M. S., L. B. Stearns. 2001. Getting deals done: The use of social networks 
in banking decision-making. Amer. Sociological Rev. 66(5) 647-671. 
North, D. C. 1991. Institutions. J. Econom. Perspectives 5(1) 97-112. 
Obstfeld, D. 2005. Social networks, the tertius iungens orientation, and involvement 
in innovation. Admin. Sci. Quart.  50(1) 100-130. 
Petersen, M. A., R. Rajan, G. 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence 
from small business lending. J. Finance 49(1) 3-37. 
Petersen, M. A., R. Rajan, G. 1995. The effect of credit market competition on 
lending relationships. Quart. J. Econom.  110(2) 407-443. 
Porter, M. E. 1980. Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and 
competitors. The Free Press, New York. 
Powell, W. W., K. W. Koput, L. Smith-Doerr. 1996. Interorganizational collaboration 
and the locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Admin. 
Sci. Quart.  41(1) 116-145. 
Rindova, V. P., T. G. Pollock, M. L. Hayward. 2006. Celebrity firms: The social 
construction of market popularity. Acad. Management Rev. 31(1) 50-71. 
Rohlfs, J. 1974. A theory of interdependent demand for a communication service. Bell 
J. Econom.  5(Spring) 16-37. 
Roncek, D. W. 1991. Using logit coefficients to obtain the effects of independent 
variables on changes in probabilities. Social Forces 70(2) 509-518. 
Simmel, G.1950. The sociology of Georg Simmel. Free Press, Glencoe, IL. 
Sinkey, J. F. J. 1989. Commercial bank financial management, 4th ed. Macmillan 
Publishing Company, New York. 
Sitkin, S. 1992. Learning through failure - The strategy of small losses. Res. Org. 
Behavior 14 231-277. 
Soda, G., A. Usai, A. Zaheer. 2004. Network memory: The influence of past and 
current networks on performance. Acad. Management J.  47(6) 893-906. 
Stabell, C. B., Ø. D. Fjeldstad. 1998. Configuring value for competitive advantage: 
On chains, shops, and networks. Strategic Management J.  19(5) 413-437. 
Stiglitz, J., A. Weiss. 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. 
Amer. Econom. Rev. 71(3) 393-410. 
Stiglitz, J. E. 1990. Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets. World Bank Economic 
Review 4(3) 351-366. 
 38
 39
Stinchcombe, A. J. 1965. Social structure and organizations. J. G. March, Handbook 
of Organizations, Rand McNally, Chicago, 142-193. 
Thakor, A. V. 2000. Editorial overview. Relationship banking. Journal of financial 
intermediation 9(1) 3-5. 
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in action. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Thornhill, S., R. Amit. 2003. Learning about failure: Bankruptcy, firm age, and the 
resource-based view. Org. Sci. 14(5) 497-509. 
Tosi, H., R. Aldag, R. Storey. 1973. On the measurement of the environment: An 
assessment of the Lawrence and Lorsch environmental uncertainty subscale. 
Admin. Sci. Quart 18(1) 27-36. 
Uzzi, B. 1996. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic 
performance of organizations. Amer. Sociological Rev. 61(4) 674-698. 
Uzzi, B. 1997. Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness. Admin. Sci. Quart.  42(3) 35-67. 
Uzzi, B. 1999. Embeddedness in the making of financial capital: How social relations 
and networks benefit firms seeking financing. Amer. Sociological Rev. 64(4) 
481-505. 
Uzzi, B., R. Lancaster. 2003. Relational Embeddedness and Learning: The Case of 
Bank Loan Managers and Their Clients. Management Sci.  49(4) 383-399. 
von Hayek, F. A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. Amer. Econom. Rev. 35(4) 
519-530. 
Wasserman, S., K. Faust. 1994. Social network analysis. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Weinzimmer, L. G., P. C. Nystrom, S. J. Freeman. 1988. Measuring organizational 
growth: Issues, consequences and guidelines. J.  Management 24(2) 235-262. 
Zuckerman, E. W. 2000. Focusing corporate product: Securities analysts and de-
diversification. Admin. Sci. Quart. 45(3) 591-619. 
Zuckerman, E. W., T. Y. Kim. 2003. The critical trade-off: Identity assignment and 
box-office success in the feature film industry. Indust. Corp. Change 12(1) 27-
67. 
 TABLE 1 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
 
 Variable Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Survi   val 0  .49 500.                  
2 Organization age 1.02 0.31 .20*                
3 Organization size 32508 45372 .04 .21**               
4 Organization 
growth 
68.33 47.13 .11* -.11* -.08              
5 Current ratio -0.05 1.51 .14* .07 .05 .03             
6 Earning ratio 0.00 0.31 .36** .06 .05 .06 .56**            
7 Equity ratio 0.27 0.73 .35** .20** .09* .03 .20** .23**           
8 Environmental 
uncertainty 
0.01 0.05 .00 -.06 .03 .30** .05 .04 .08          
9 Metropolitan area 0.51 0.50 .03 .04 .01 .09* -.06 -.04 .00 .05         
10 Firm-banks network 
concentration 
0.93 0.13 .14* -.05 -.14* .03 .00 .10* .07 .03 .07        
11 Firm-bank network 
size 
1.73 0.83 .00 .24** .22* -.05 .05 .04 .07 -.07 -.05 -.57**       
12 Firm status 0.03 0.89 -.07 -.04 -.04 .02 .01 .03 -.05 .03 -.03 -.04 -.05      
13 Customer-set 
connectedness 
0.99 0.40 .12** .06 .09* .02 .04 .00 .07 -.05 .13** .09* -.12** .01     
14 Bank regional 
market share 
9.03 8.03 .06 -.03 .16* -.06 -.04 -.02 .05 .03 .28** .06 -.04 .01 .11*    
15 Bank regional 
investment  
21.77 13.06 .02 .01 -.01 .02 .03 .00 .10* .06 -.04 .11* -.13** .02 .00 .01   
16 Mediator customer-
size based 
specialization 
1355 2227 .12** .01 .03 -.04 .04 .02 .13* -.14** .15* .03 -.09* -.06 .38** .09* .16**  
17 Mediator 
investment-based 
specialization 
2.21 3.56 .12** .03 .04 .03 .03 .01 .00 .00 .02 -.08 .09* -.04 .00 .07 -.10* .17** 
         N = 462,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01 
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TABLE 2 
Results of hierarchical logistic regression on the likelihood of survival 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Organization age .790† 
(.455) 
.889† 
(.467) 
.942* 
(.476) 
.888 
(.480) 
.916† 
(.491) 
2.507** 
(.798) 
Organization size -.064 
(.114) 
-.024 
(.117) 
-.030 
(.119) 
-.054 
(.120) 
-.076 
(.125) 
-0.023 
(.132) 
Organization growth .005† 
(.003) 
.005† 
(.003) 
.005† 
(.003) 
.005† 
(.003) 
.006* 
(.003) 
.045** 
(.012) 
Financial ratios       
  Current ratio 2.024** 
(.739) 
2.061** 
(.755) 
2.081** 
(.767) 
2.125** 
(.773) 
2.046* 
(.793) 
1.447† 
(.842) 
  Earning ratio 5.869** 
(.947) 
5.626** 
(.953) 
5.797** 
(.965) 
6.012** 
(.982) 
6.038** 
(1.002) 
6.293** 
(1.074) 
  Equity ratio 2.457** 
(.606) 
2.559** 
(.631) 
2.560** 
(.632) 
2.499** 
(.622) 
2.502** 
(.635) 
3.153** 
(.705) 
       
Environmental 
uncertainty 
-2.663 
(2.915) 
-2.388 
(2.983) 
-2.134 
(3.042) 
-1.254 
(3.081) 
-1.908 
(3.206) 
-1.001 
(3.412) 
Metropolitan area .174 
(.255) 
.123 
(.258) 
.073 
(.260) 
.001 
(.265) 
-.036 
(.283) 
-.018 
(.298) 
Firm-banks network 
concentration 
 
 
1.562 
(1.179) 
1.285 
(1.187) 
1.124 
(1.202) 
1.219 
(1.249) 
.352 
(1.271) 
Firm-banks network 
size 
 -.127 
(.186) 
-.189 
(.188) 
-.154 
(.191) 
-.174 
(.196) 
-.302 
(.208) 
Firm status   -.308* 
(.141) 
-.329* 
(.142) 
-.333* 
(.143) 
-.304* 
(.150) 
Customer-set 
connectedness 
   .755* 
(.326) 
.855* 
(.370) 
1.339** 
(.444) 
Bank regional market 
share 
    .014 
(.018) 
.014 
(.020) 
Bank regional 
investment 
    -.410 
(1.002) 
-.129 
(1.071) 
Mediator customer-size 
based specialization 
    -.074 
(.153) 
.122 
(.161) 
Mediator investment-
based specialization 
    .362* 
(.173) 
.660† 
(.353) 
Customer-set 
connectedness x 
organization age 
     -.040* 
(.016) 
Organization growth x 
Mediator investment-
based specialization  
     .078** 
(.021) 
Constant -2.294** 
(.638) 
-3.656* 
(1.429) 
-3.364* 
(1.442) 
-3.996** 
(1.484) 
-4.088** 
(1.529) 
-7.446** 
(1.888) 
Log-likelihood -412.18** -407.20† -403.31* -396.84* -390.07 -360.58** 
Degrees of freedom 14 16 17 18 22 24 
   Standard errors are in parentheses; N = 462. Industry dummies are excluded from the table. 
† p  < 0.10 
 * p  < 0.05 
** p  < 0.01 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
 
 Variable Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 
1 Bank loss 700181 367664     
2 Bank growth 1.51 .27 -.02    
3 Bank size 13659 25885 -.20 .06   
4 Customer-set 
connectedness 
.97 .53 -.52** .04 .13  
5 Proportion of 
customer failures 
1.79 .41 .18 .20 -.05 -.54** 
     N = 30 
** P < 0.01 
 
 
TABLE 4 
OLS regression estimates of bank loss 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Customer-set 
connectedness 
 -.548** 
(0.179) 
Bank growth 
 
-.081 
(.404) 
.026 
(.354) 
Bank size -.117 
(.106) 
.078 
(.094) 
Intercept .021 
(.623) 
.429 
(0.563) 
R2 .043 .297 
F .608 3.660* 
∆R2  .254 
F  9.385** 
     N = 30 
*   P < 0.05 
** P < 0.01 
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TABLE 5 
OLS regression estimates of the proportion of customer failures per bank. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Customer-set 
connectedness  
 -.516** 
(.168) 
Bank growth 
 
.460 
(.352) 
.261 
(.314) 
Bank size -.029 
(.109) 
-.001 
(.096) 
Intercept 1.240 
(.537) 
2.504 
(.538) 
R2 .062 .312 
F .896 3.936* 
∆R2  .250 
F  9.453** 
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
Interaction effect between customer-set connectedness and firm age 
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